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Departmental Orders

SHERIFF DEPARTMENT RULES, POLICIES AND ORDERS   

IN GENERAL 

Appellant’s acknowledgement of rules and his acknowledgment that he failed to comply with them is prima facie proof of a violation. In re Fergerson, CSA 64-17, 6 (3/16/18).

Appellant did not establish that discipline set bad policy precedent with his claim that deputies cannot simultaneously execute all their duties, as other deputies have not filed appeals claiming they are unable to execute more than one duty. In re Fergerson, CSB 64-17A, 3 (1/17/19).

Deputy’s “good faith” act of misconduct does not insulate him from discipline for plain, proven rules violations. In re Nguyen, CSB 19-17, 3 (1/18/18).

Hearing officer did not misinterpret DSD Use of force policy where, once deputy stepped back from inmate who was trying to grab him through door flap, deputy was no longer under attack and became the aggressor when he re-approached inmate and used his Taser. In re Nguyen, CSB 19-17, 2-3 (1/18/18).

Deputy who withdrew from inmate grabbing him through door flap, then re-approached and used Taser, did not use least amount of force available, as he could have employed the assistance of another deputy to secure the flap. In re Nguyen, CSB 19-17, 2 (1/18/18).

Hearing officer did not misinterpret DSD’s use of force policy in finding deputy’s use of Taser on an inmate through the door flap to secure the flap was unreasonable, where deputy had numerous less-forceful options available. In re Nguyen, CSB 19-17, 2 (1/18/18).

Agency disregard of its internal policy requiring two division chiefs at the pre-disciplinary meeting do not concern hearing officer review, in the absence of showing violation of employee’s right to fair hearing, or other prejudice. In re Rocha, CSB 19-16, 5 (7/6/17).

Personnel rules should not be defined by inappropriate workplace culture but should be enforceable to change that culture. In re Gutierrez, Colo.App 65-11, 10 (5/19/16).

Rules may not be construed to sanction inappropriate conduct merely because it is widespread. In re Gutierrez, Colo.App 65-11, 10 (5/19/16).

In interpreting Sheriff Dept. rules, the plain and ordinary meaning of words should apply. In re Kemp, CSB 19-13, 5 (7/28/14).

Where a hearing officer does not find a violation of a departmental rule, there is no finding to review on petition by the employee to reverse the discipline. In re Kemp, CSB 19-13, 6 (7/28/14).

To be enforceable, DSD rules must be clear, reasonable and uniformly enforced. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, pp 5-7 (2/27/09). 

A course of conduct defense to a standing order may be valid, but only in the absence of a subsequent directive which provides reasonable notice of the intent to enforce it. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 5 (2/27/09). 

Chain of command and strict adherence to orders take on added importance in light of the safeguarding mission of the sheriff’s department. In re Delmonico, CSA 53-06, 6 (10/26/06).

RECEPTION DESK POST ORDER - WARRANTS 

Violation established where order makes it apparent that any officer taking an individual into custody is responsible for handcuffing that individual and appellant acknowledged she did not handcuff individual turning herself in. In re Koonce, CSA 34-17, 4 (12/22/17).

IMPOUND MANUAL 801.00

Appellant, Vehicle Impound employee, violated CSR 16-29R [now 16-28D], by violating Manual Section 801.00 (Customer Property), when he learned of bullets removed from an impounded auto but failed to record them in a Property Receipt Form. In re Tamburino, CSA 40-17, 8 (4/23/18).

MATRIX


The agency properly disciplined appellant with a presumptive, as opposed to a mitigated, penalty where he relied on largely stale commendations and he unnecessarily escalated an incident with an inmate and created a potential risk to himself and other individuals. In re Jordan, CSA 21-18, 5-6 (7/19/18).

The agency’s Civilian Review Administrator is entitled to testify, regardless of law enforcement experience, why the agency believes a deputy’s conduct has violated agency rules. In re Hammernik & Trujillo, CSB 41-17A & 42-17A, 3 (2/7/19).

DSD disciplinary matrix offers guidelines, not rules, for assessing discipline. In re Sparer, CSB 71A-18, 4 (7/18/19).

The DSD decision maker has the discretion to determine what is relevant in deciding what discipline to impose. In re Sparer, CSB 71A-18, 4 (7/18/19). In re Sparer, CSB 71A-18, n3 (7/18/19).

§19.6.1 of Matrix requires evidence of the employee’s willingness to accept responsibility and to acknowledge wrongdoing. In re Sparer, CSB 71A-18, 5 (7/18/19) [emphasis added by CSB] .

§ 19.6.5 of Matrix regarding mitigation applies only to offenses of minimal severity. In re Sparer, CSB 71A-18, n.4 (7/18/19).

The Civilian Review Administrator, to whom the Manager of Safety [now Executive Director] has delegated authority to issue discipline, has authority to act on behalf of the Manager of Safety. In re Rocha, CSA 19-16, 7 (9/14/16), citing In re Gale, CSB 02-15A, 2-3 (7/21/16).

Agency’s failure to comply strictly with its procedural requirement, to have two division chiefs present at Appellant’s pre-disciplinary meeting, is not fatal to discipline under the CSRs. In re Rocha, CSA 19-16, 7 (9/14/16), citing In re Gale, CSB 02-15A, 3-4 (7/21/16). 

Agency’s failure to comply strictly with its procedural requirement, to have two division chiefs present at Appellant’s pre-disciplinary meeting, did not affect Appellant’s due process rights on appeal, since its hearing was a de novo consideration of the underlying facts. In re Rocha, CSA 19-16, 7 (9/14/16).

The measure of the CSR 16-20 [now 16-41] considerations for determining discipline is whether the penalty assessed is within the range of penalties that could be imposed by a reasonable and prudent administrator, or is clearly excessive. In re Rocha, CSA 19-16, 7 (9/14/16), citing In re Ford, 48-14A, 8 (CSB 9/17/15).

Agency did not prove lack of candor by appellant who gave different, but not inherently inconsistent, reasons for restraining an inmate, her reasons were readily attributable to honest differences in recollection, and the agency did not charge appellant with dishonesty. In re Rocha, CSA 19-16, 8 (9/14/16).

Inconsistent statements, alone, are insufficient to establish dishonesty or lack of candor, as they require an element of deception either by commission or omission. In re Rocha, CSA 19-16, 8 (9/14/16), citing In re Lewis, CSB 51-14A, 5-6 (11/5/15).

Agency did not establish aggravation of penalty for deputy who improperly handcuffed inmate based on a speculative “actual and demonstrable legal or financial risk” simply because the inmate could possibly sue the City, and since the nurse confirmed no injury from the allegedly overly-tightened handcuffs. In re Rocha, CSA 19-16, 9 (9/14/16).

Agency did not establish aggravation of penalty for deputy who handcuffed inmate to a sally port bench for 13 minutes, based on remote possibility of a lawsuit and the minimal damages that such misconduct would warrant. In re Rocha, CSA 19-16, 9 (9/14/16).

Agency inconsistently applied its Matrix with its 16-day suspension of deputy, who improperly handcuffed inmate for 13 minutes but caused inmate no injury or distress, as other similarly situated deputies who used more egregious force received only 10-day suspensions. In re Rocha, CSA 19-16, 9 (9/14/16).

Under the CSRs, Agency’s 16-day suspension of deputy, who improperly handcuffed inmate for 13 minutes but caused inmate no injury or distress, was not within the range of alternatives available to a reasonable and prudent administrator, and was clearly excessive under the circumstances. In re Rocha, CSA 19-16, 9 (9/14/16), citing In re Ford, 48-14A, 8 (CSB 9/17/15); DSD Handbook Policy Statement.

DSD’s failure to consider factors which its disciplinary matrix deems “a necessary first step” to determine the appropriate conduct category, was clearly erroneous. In re Borrego, CSA 43-18, 4 (10/22/18).

Agency’s election of Category C was clearly erroneous where (1) DSD failed to follow its matrix in identifying appropriate conduct category; and (2) evidence stipulated by the parties failed to establish appellant’s wrongdoing had more than a minimal impact and thus failed to establish a pronounced negative impact on operations or professional image of the DSD. In re Borrego, CSA 43-18, 5 (10/22/18).

After determining the proper conduct categories and associated ranges of discipline for all misconduct, the decision maker is tasked with weighing mitigating and aggravating factors before settling on the specific discipline. In re Borrego, CSA 43-18, 5 (10/22/18).

Under the DSD disciplinary matrix, mitigation includes, but is not limited, to: willingness to accept responsibility and acknowledge wrongdoing; circumstances under which the rule was violated; the culpable mental state of the deputy in the commission of the violation; complimentary history, including awards, commendations and positive public recognition; if minimal, the severity of the current offense and the lack of or minimal nature of any consequences caused by the current offense; prior work history, such as positive evaluations and/or work performance, or voluntary advanced, job-related training; or minimal or lack of prior disciplinary history relative to the deputy’s years of service. In re Borrego, CSA 43-18, 5-6 (10/22/18).

The DSD disciplinary matrix lists fourteen non-exclusive factors for the decision-maker to evaluate potential aggravating factors in assessing discipline. In re Borrego, CSA 43-18, 6 (10/22/18).

The DSD disciplinary matrix makes clear that merely restating the definition of a category of wrongdoing is not an aggravating factor. In re Borrego, CSA 43-18, 6 (10/22/18), citing DSD matrix at §§ 19.4, 19.10.

DSD’s claim that inferred appellant’s dishonesty was an aggravating factor remained unproven where it did not allege deceit, dishonesty, or lack of candor. In re Borrego, CSA 43-18, 6-7 (10/22/18).

No deceit will be imputed when parties stipulated to facts and no allegation of deceit was contained therein. In re Borrego, CSA 43-18, 7 (10/22/18).

Under the DSD disciplinary matrix, the presence of mitigating factors, alone, does not require a mitigated penalty. In re Borrego, CSA 43-18, 7 (10/22/18), citing In re Gajarszki, et al., CSB 30-17, 32-17 & 33-17, 3 (10/18/18).

The DSD disciplinary matrix does not prohibit a double demotion. In re Koonce, CSB 34-17, n.5 (6/21/18).

Hearing officer did not err in finding that appellant violated post order governing inmate surrenders where appellant claimed that she was not subject to that post order, but subjected herself to it by assuming its duties. In re Koonce, CSB 34-17, 4 (6/21/18).

The lowest category for penalizing an inappropriate use of force in the DSD disciplinary matrix falls under its category D. In re Cole, CSA 04-18, 4 (4/6/18).

DSD’s disciplinary matrix specifies “special circumstances” that justify a penalty beyond the maximum in the aggravated range. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 14 (12/8/17), citing DSD handbook § 25.0 et seq.

Discipline under the DSD’s matrix assessed as “extraordinary aggravation” must be documented and explained. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 14 (12/8/17), citing DSD handbook § 25.4.3.

Demotion with reduction in pay in DSD may be justified if the deputy’s conduct proves he is unfit to fulfill the responsibilities and duties of his rank, which, in turn, is measured by his “lack of ability, willingness or worthiness to perform in the current rank.” In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 14 (12/8/17), citing DSD handbook § 25.5.1.

One measure of extraordinary aggravation that justifies demotion is whether the conduct would have prevented “(raised substantial questions as to)” the deputy’s fitness to hold that rank in the first place. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 14 (12/8/17), citing DSD handbook § 25.5.2.

Extraordinary aggravation under the DSD handbook includes the factors of responsibility and trustworthiness. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 14 (12/8/17), citing DSD handbook § 25.5.3 et seq.

Agency did not establish extraordinary aggravation under its disciplinary matrix where it claimed wrongdoing accompanied by appellant’s high rank justified 2-level demotion, but high rank may justify aggravation only within the normal parameters of the matrix. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 14 (12/8/17), citing DSD Handbook § 20.

No extraordinary aggravation may be established under DSD disciplinary matrix where the justification is merely a quotation of the order, rule or procedure at issue without an explanation of its basis. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 14 (12/8/17), citing DSD Handbook § 25.4.3.

Every failure to comply with an order, rule or procedure may be cause for discipline, but does not, per se justify aggravation of the penalty. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 14 (12/8/17).

Double demotion under DSD disciplinary matrix not justified where DSD claimed, in conclusory fashion, that leaving appellant in his current rank would have a negative impact on DSD operations without explaining why or in what manner. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 14 (12/8/17).

Double demotion under DSD disciplinary matrix not justified where DSD claimed leaving appellant in his current rank would negatively impact the subordinate deputies’ perceptions of their leaders, but the evidence related only to wrongdoing by other officers and not conduct of appellant. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 14 (12/8/17).

Parroting a proscription under the DSD’s disciplinary matrix does not establish it. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 15 (12/8/17).

Discipline not justified under DSD disciplinary matrix where DSD concluded, in circular fashion, “Wilson engaged in misconduct that would have raised substantial question as to his fitness to hold the rank of Chief, had his misconduct occurred prior to attaining the rank of Chief.” In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 15 (12/8/17).

DSD allegation that its disciplinary system would be rendered ineffective by retaining appellant in his current position is, on its face, a failure to establish a basis for that conclusion as required under its disciplinary matrix. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 14-15 (12/8/17).

Category C of DSD’s disciplinary matrix was a reasonable assessment of harm done when appellant-chief privately negotiated the terms of surrender into custody of the granddaughter of the ex-mayor. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 15-16 (12/8/17).

Under DSD disciplinary matrix the higher an officer’s rank, the more is expected of the officer, and thus, rank may be an aggravating factor. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 16 (12/8/17).

Under DSD disciplinary matrix, appellant’s rank as chief was aggravating factor in assessing discipline. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 16 (12/8/17).     

Even taking appellant’s rank as an aggravating factor, no more than the presumptive penalty could reasonably be assessed when considering his unblemished and highly-decorated history. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 17 (12/8/17).

Extraordinary mitigation demonstrated by appellant’s absence of any discipline in his twenty-five year career, numerous commendations and awards, significant representation and promotion of this agency and the City, national recognition for his service, and status as a positive face of his agency even after the Agency’s discipline in this case. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 18 (12/8/17).

Double demotion as an extraordinary discipline under DSD’s disciplinary matrix not justified where agency claimed a lesser punishment would be an inadequate remedy for someone who demonstrated a leadership gap and lack of concern for subordinates, but even double demotion would have left him in a leadership and supervisory position. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 18 (12/8/17).

Double demotion under DSD disciplinary matrix not justified where DSD did not prove its principal complaint – that appellant caused arrestee to be improperly expedited through booking by subordinates - since appellant credibly denied he told subordinate to walk arrestee through the process, and the only witness to the statement did not testify. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 18-19 (12/8/17).

Double demotion was clearly excessive and was beyond the range of penalties available to a reasonable administrator where the most serious allegations against appellant were not proven, and he had extraordinary service, vacant disciplinary record, and a strong likelihood of reform. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 19 (12/8/17).

Restoration of DSD rank, pay and benefits were due appellant where double demotion was modified to a thirty-day suspension. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 19 (12/8/17).

Appellant deputy admitted he violated this rule when he acknowledged the rule but wore his uniform and sidearm to his child support hearing. In re Strauch, CSA 37-11, 7 (12/20/11).

This rule applies to a witness to, and not the actor in, a use of force incident.  It is illogical to require the actor to witness her own actions, particularly since another rule requires the actor to file a use of force report. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 21 (2/27/09).  

Appellant’s inaccurate log entries that appellants had made rounds, which he defended with his alleged assumption his co-worker had made them, was unsupported by the evidence and violated RR 200.3 (Accurate Reporting). In re DeMello and Fazio, CSA 12-18 & 14-18, 7 (6/7/18). 

Where deputy filed his report of an inmate incident before the inmate accused him of racism for calling him Abdul instead of Mohammed, deputy’s failure to include his use of the wrong first name did not prove his report was inaccurate within the meaning of this rule. In re Underwood, CSA 55-15, 10 (4/29/16), citing In re Lewis, CSB 51-14, 5-6 (11/9/15).

The same evidence which establishes a violation of CSR 16-60E also establishes a violation of Departmental Order 200.4.2, Commission of a Deceptive Act. In re Romero, CSA 01-12, 8 (4/17/12).

Fraternization is not limited to sexual relationships, but includes any personal relationship between a deputy and an inmate. In re Romero, CSA 01-12, 9 (4/17/12).

Deputy sheriff violated this rule where he: spent inordinate amounts of time with an inmate, placed his own funds in her inmate account, sought her out ten times per month when she was out of custody, and engaged in a twenty-minute phone call from her. In re Romero, CSA 01-12, 9 (4/17/12).

Deputy sheriff’s failure to self-report his personal relationship with an inmate was a violation of this rule. In re Romero, CSA 01-12, 9 (4/17/12). 

Agency established that appellant was dishonest in violation of departmental rule when appellant's description of her use of force against inmate and assertion that force was justified because other deputy involved had difficulty controlling inmate were contradicted by other deputy's testimony and by Diginet recording of the incident. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 21-22 (2/27/09).

Appellant's denial that supervisor's inquiry into her knitting on duty was an order to cease because it inaccurately described her crocheting as knitting was dishonest in light of the obvious intent of the supervisor's question. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 4 (2/27/09).

Where evidence showed that use of crochet needles in jail setting was potentially harmful, and the directive to cease bringing crocheting materials to work were clear to other deputies present when directive was given, appellant's assertion that order applied only to yarn was dishonest. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 4 (2/27/09).

Deputy sheriff's denial that sergeant's "please do not do this again" was an order to cease knitting on post was dishonest in light of the obvious intent of the words and the sergeant's authority over appellant. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 4 (2/27/09).

A violation of RR-200.4.1 can occur when false statements are made without premeditation or an intent to influence the outcome of an investigation or official proceeding. In re Kemp, CSB 19-13, 3 (7/29/14).

Conduct violating RR- 200.4.2 requires a different intent than conduct violating 200.4.1, and therefore a violation of RR-200.4.1 does not necessarily prove a violation of RR-200.4.2. In re Kemp, CSB 19-13, 3 (7/29/14).

A violation of 200.4.2 requires an intent to convey false information in connection with investigations or official proceedings, whereas 200.4.1 does not require an intent to influence the outcome of an investigation or official proceeding. In re Kemp, CSB 19-13, 2 (7/28/14).

Hearing officer did not misinterpret RR-200.4.1 by finding that deputy's denial that he slapped an inmate violated the regulation. In re Kemp, CSB 19-13, 3 (7/29/14).

A violation of RR-200.4.1 does not necessarily also prove a violation of RR-200.4.2. In re Kemp, CSB 19-13, 3 (7/29/14).

IN GENERAL

Deceptive act established when deputy misrepresented position of inmate’s hands on cell door flap, which tended to minimize the risk of injury to inmate when deputy kicked door flap. In re Roybal, CSB 44-16, 2 (5/18/17).

Deceptive act established when deputy claimed kicking door flap to inmate’s cell was necessary to entice dangerous inmate to back away in order to secure door flap, but after kicking the flap, deputy walked away without securing it, and inmate was not aggressive at the time. In re Roybal, CSB 44-16, 2 (5/18/17).

Deputy’s omission, twice, to mention to his supervisor that he used force in kicking door flap to inmate’s cell, was intentional considering his obligation to report all use of force, and in light of reporting only inmate’s aggression preceding the kick. In re Roybal, CSB 44-16, 2 (5/18/17).

Conduct violating RR-200.4.2 requires a different intent than conduct violating 200.4.1, and therefore a violation of RR-200.4.1 does not necessarily prove a violation of RR-200.4.2. In re Kemp, CSB 19-13, 3 (7/29/14).

A violation of 200.4.2 requires an intent to convey false information in connection with investigations or official proceedings, whereas 200.4.1 does not require an intent to influence the outcome of an investigation or official proceeding. In re Kemp, CSB 19-13, 2 (7/29/14).

A violation of RR-200.4.2 requires an intent to convey false information in connection with investigations or official proceedings. In re Kemp, CSB 19-13, 3 (7/29/14).

A violation of RR-200.4.1 does not necessarily also prove a violation of RR-200.4.2. In re Kemp, CSB 19-13, 3 (7/29/14).

The same evidence which establishes a violation of CSR 16-60 E also establishes a violation of Departmental Order 200.4.2, Commission of a Deceptive Act. In re Romero, CSA 01-12, 8 (4/17/12).   

Agency established that appellant was dishonest in violation of departmental rule when appellant's description of her use of force against inmate and assertion that force was justified because other deputy involved had difficulty controlling inmate were contradicted by other deputy's testimony and by Diginet recording of the incident. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 21-22 (2/27/09).

Appellant's denial that supervisor's inquiry into her knitting on duty was an order to cease because it inaccurately described her crocheting as knitting was dishonest in light of the obvious intent of the supervisor's question. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 4 (2/27/09).

Where evidence showed that use of crochet needles in jail setting was potentially harmful, and the directive to cease bringing crocheting materials to work were clear to other deputies present when directive was given, appellant's assertion that order applied only to yarn was dishonest. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 4 (2/27/09).

Deputy sheriff's denial that sergeant's "please do not do this again" was an order to cease knitting on post was dishonest in light of the obvious intent of the words and the sergeant's authority over appellant. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 4 (2/27/09).

FOUND 

Deputy’s partner and an uninterested inmate rebutted deputy’s denial that he told an inmate there are no cameras where they were going, and proved deputy was intentionally deceptive about a fact material to his use of force. In re Turner, CSA 01-17, 5 (6/26/17).

Deputy’s statement that inmate said, “if you touch me, I’m going to fuck you up”, was not intended to, and did not, deceive the agency that inmate threatened him. In re Turner, CSA 01-17, 5 (6/26/17).

Deputy’s statement that inmate’s fists were clenched was his impression, which was not shown to be clearly wrong by the video, and did not manifest an intent to deceive the agency. In re Turner, CSA 01-17, 6 (6/26/17).

Agency did not prove deputy lied when he said he took off his glasses to protect his eyes, which would be at risk regardless of whether deputy intended to initiate a fight with the inmate, or expected the inmate to initiate it. In re Turner, CSA 01-17, 6 (6/26/17).

Testimony of two deputy witnesses showed appellant asked one of them to omit from her report the fact that appellant removed his glasses before the use of force, but denied making the request with intent to mislead investigators. In re Turner, CSA 01-17, 6-7 (6/26/17).

NOT FOUND 

Six months after a use of force incident, Appellant’s characterization of his mood during the incident as slightly irritated or excited was not a willful departure from the truth. In re Turner, CSA 01-17, 4 (6/26/17).

Based on the video evidence and the unanimous testimony of five observers, deputy knowingly and falsely denied that he was arguing with the inmate, a material fact in the investigation, in violation of RR-200.4.2. In re Turner, CSA 01-17, 4 (6/26/17).

A minor mistake about the sequence of events did not prove that deputy falsely reported his own then-existing motivation for separating inmates.  In re Turner, CSA 01-17, 4 (6/26/17).

Appellant’s statement that he shoved inmate to create space between himself and the inmate was not intentionally deceptive based on video and testimony of two observers. In re Turner, CSA 01-17, 4 (6/26/17).

NOT FOUND

Appellant did not prove the agency was clearly erroneous in determining he committed deceptive acts, where the video evidence showed he lied during his deposition about and during the agency’s investigation of his incident with an inmate. In re Keller, CSB 47-14A, 6 (6/20/19).

Appellant did not prove the agency was clearly erroneous in determining he violated RR 200.4.2 (Deceptive Acts), where the video evidence showed he lied during his deposition about and during the agency’s investigation of his incident with an inmate. In re Keller, CSA 47-14, 7-8 (6/14/18).

Agency failed to prove appellant, Vehicle Impound employee, violated CSR 16-29R [now 16-28D], by violating RR 200.4.2 (Deception), by receiving bullets found in impounded auto but then denying he had received them, where two other witnesses testified customers left with the bullets. In re Tamburino, CSA 40-17, 8 (4/23/18).

Evidence supported finding that appellant did not commit deceptive act where eye witness testified two others took bullets from impounded car when appellant was not present, and second witness affirmed the first eye witness. In re Tamburino, CSB 40-17A, 3 (5/16/19).

The NCIC contains confidential criminal justice information, is closely monitored for unauthorized use, and misuse may jeopardize accreditation for use by an entire law enforcement agency. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 6 (12/8/17).

NCIC’s own policy divides its information into “restricted” and “unrestricted” data. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 6 (12/8/17).

Plain language of this rule did not support agency’s interpretation that this rule prohibited chief from giving NCIC information to a member of the public. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 6 (12/8/17).

Chief who provided bond and warrant information to a citizen did not violate “law enforcement purpose” phrase of 200.6. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 6 (12/8/17).

While a citizen seeking warrant information about another citizen is evidently not a law enforcement purpose under NCIC policy, the same cannot be said about a law-enforcement officer providing similar information to a citizen about the citizen’s warrant. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, n.5 (12/8/17).

IN GENERAL

Where deputy’s duties at housing desk included monitoring forty eight cells and the activities in the pod, his failure to notice 20 seconds of screen time in one cell does not by itself establish a failure to attend to his duties. In re Trujillo, CSA 18-17, 4 (8/1/17). 

Deputy violated rule when he failed to check eligibility of inmate before releasing him. In re Mitchell, CSA 57-13, 5 (5/7/14).

Appellant's knitting on duty prevented her from giving her full attention to her primary duties, in violation of departmental order. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 5 (2/27/09).

Standing orders do not require a direct order to be enforceable.  In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 7 (2/27/09).

FOUND 

Knitting violates duty to give undivided attention to duties.  In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 5 (2/27/09).

Direct order not to crochet while on duty overcame defense that such activity had always been allowed.  In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 5 (2/27/09).

Post Order prohibiting needlework while on duty was reasonable since needles can be converted to shanks.  In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 5 (2/27/09).

Uniformity of enforcement was established where other deputies who had done needlework while on duty were also disciplined under this rule, and supervisor credibly testified he always gives two verbal warnings, then assesses discipline for such activities.  In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 5 (2/27/09).

Agency failed to prove violation of this rule where it claimed deputy was viewing an internet website when he mistakenly released an inmate, since the evidence showed that the website was minimized at the time in question and did not interfere with his duties. In re Mitchell, CSA 57-13, 5-6 (5/7/14).

 

Agency proved armed deputy violated this rule by falling asleep while guarding an inmate in a publicly-accessible hospital room. In re Andrews, CSA 16-17, 3-4 (8/1/17). 

Agency proved violation of this rule where Appellant left her post three times without procuring coverage or permission. In re Barra, CSA 1-16, 4 (3/10/17).

Agency failed to prove deputy disobeyed an order where Agency alleged supervisor ordered deputy to go only to missing inmate’s last-known address, but preponderance of evidence did not support such a limited order was given. In re Mitchell, CSA 57-13, 6 (5/7/14).

Supervisor's directive need not be prefaced with words like "I order you" to be the lawful order of a superior. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 9 (2/27/09).

An objective standard governs this D.O.. In re Gutierrez, Colo.App. 65-11, 6-7 (5/19/16).

An objective standard of review is based on conduct and perceptions external to a particular person, while a subjective standard is based on a particular person’s views and experiences. In re Gutierrez, Colo.App. 65-11, 7-8 (5/19/16), citing Survey Sols., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 956 P.2d 1275, 1276 (Colo.App. 1998).

Objective standard of review does not permit consideration of the parties’ intent, rather the fact finder must evaluate conduct in light of how a reasonable person would act or respond in similar circumstances. In re Gutierrez, Colo.App. 65-11, 7-8 (5/19/16), citing Survey Sols., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 956 P.2d 1275, 1276 (Colo.App. 1998).

Subjective standard of review is based on claimant’s own sensitivities or reactions. In re Gutierrez, Colo.App. 65-11, 7-8 (5/19/16).

The standard for sexual harassment does not vary depending on the work environment. In re Gutierrez, Colo.App. 65-11, 10 (5/19/16), citing Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999).

CSB abused its discretion in applying subjective standard to determine appellant did not violate this rule. In re Gutierrez, Colo.App. 65-11, 10-11 (5/19/16).

Hearing officer committed error by considering parties’ intent under this rule. In re Gutierrez, Colo.App. 65-11, 9 (5/19/16).

Hearing officer erred in determining appellant did not violate this rule where it was pervasive in this employee culture to make gestures and statements that were not offensive to them but which would be perceived by reasonable person as offensive. In re Gutierrez, Colo.App. 65-11, 10 (5/19/16).

DSD officer violated this rule where he made gestures and comments that were acceptable to female officer, but which would offend a reasonable person in her place, since his position would contravene Sheriff Dept.’s purpose in changing such workplace culture. In re Gutierrez, Colo.App. 65-11, 10-11 (5/19/16), citing Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F. 3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999).

Alleged hostile work environment may not be evaluated based on its internal culture, since, under that analysis, the more pervasive the inappropriate conduct, the more difficult it would be to bring a claim. In re Gutierrez, Colo.App. 65-11, 10 (5/19/16), citing Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F. 3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999).

This rule must be evaluated under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the allegedly offensive conduct. In re Gutierrez, CSB 65-11, 3 (4/4/13).

Factors to be considered under this rule are whether the appellant intended to be disrespectful, insolent or abusive and whether the subject of the conduct reasonably found it to be so. In re Gutierrez, CSB 65-11, 4 (4/4/13). 

When deputy sheriff engaged in extended dispute of superior's directive to leave crochet needles out of the jail, she violated this rule. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 6 (2/27/09). 

Deputy violated CSR 16-60 L as his unexpected hard slap on the buttocks of a fellow officer in front of his peers constituted physical assault in a city workplace, in violation of DO 2441.1D and RR 200.15. In re Rogers, CSA 57-07, 6 (3/18/08).

A deputy violates RR 200.17.1 (Failure to Aid) if she fails to assist other deputies with their duties when the circumstances reasonably require such assistance. In re Sparer, CSA 71-18, 2 (1/30/19).

A deputy’s duty to aid and assist under RR 200.17.1 applies when it is evident a deputy or deputies are struggling to control an inmate. In re Sparer, CSA 71-18, 3 (1/30/19).

A deputy’s duty to be present at the nurse’s station so that nurses are not alone with inmates does not alter the deputy’s first priority, to aid and assist under RR 200.17.1. In re Sparer, CSA 71-18, 4-5 (1/30/19).

Violation not clearly erroneous where appellant claimed too many deputies already responded to struggle with inmate, but the record established at the time she chose not to assist, not many deputies were assisting and it was up to sergeant in charge, not the deputy to determine how much help was required. In re Sparer, CSB 71A-18, 3 (7/18/19). 

Deputy assigned to residential pod violated CSR 16-29R (Violation of agency regulation) [now 16-28R] by violating RR 200.9 (full attention to duties) by allowing inmates to congregate, unattended, around the officer’s desk. In re Fergerson, CSA 64-17, 3 (3/16/18).

Deputy’s duty to prevent inmates from congregating around the officer’s desk derives from duty to search for and prevent inmates from obtaining contraband and from duty to ensure safety of inmates and staff. In re Fergerson, CSA 64-17, 3-4 (3/16/18).

That deputy was performing one duty is no defense to his violation of a rule by his violation of a second duty, as deputies are expected to perform more than one duty at a time in order to maintain safety in the detention facility. In re Fergerson, CSA 64-17, 4 (3/16/18).

Deputy violated CSR 16-29R (Violation of agency regulation) [now 16-28R] by violating RR 200.9 (Full attention to duties) when he failed to secure the doors in the residential pod. In re Fergerson, CSA 64-17, 4-5 (3/16/18).

Deputy’s defense that he could not search an inmate entering a pod because he did not see him enter the unlocked door was unavailing in view of his duty to secure the pod doors, and video showed it was likely deputy saw him enter. In re Fergerson, CSA 64-17, 6 (3/16/18).

Deputy’s defense that he did not pat search every inmate entering and leaving pod because “no one does” was unavailing in view of the clear and unambiguous duty to search every inmate, and there was no evidence the duty was overly-burdensome.  In re Fergerson, CSA 64-17, 6 (3/16/18).

Courtroom deputy violated post order prohibiting attorneys in inmate chute and exercised poor judgment when she allowed herself to be surrounded on three sides, rendering her unable to quickly respond to other dangers in courtroom. In re Leyba, CSA 31-16, 6 (8/29/16).

It is uncertain this rule provides sufficient notice what conduct or performance would constitute a violation, in the absence of any other basis for wrongdoing or poor performance. In re Rolando, CSA 40-15, 4 (1/26/16).

The phrase “sound judgment and discretion” does not lend itself to a plain and ordinary meaning necessary for enforcement. In re Rolando, CSA 40-15, 4 (1/26/16), citing In re Kemp, CSB 19-13A, 5 (7/28/14).

No violation established where agency failed to establish appellant had notice of directive he was alleged to have disobeyed. In re Rolando, CSA 40-15, 4-5 (1/26/16).

No violation where agency alleged deputy wrongfully permitted inmate to change to civilian clothes, but deputy’s denial was equally plausible. In re Rolando, CSA 40-15, 5-6 (1/26/16).

No violation established where agency claimed sergeant should have known not to allow inmate to go to arraignment in civilian clothes, but evidence was conflicting whether such policy is widely known. In re Rolando, CSA 40-15, 7 (1/26/16).

Deputy violated rule when he failed to check eligibility of inmate before releasing him. In re Mitchell, CSA 57-13, 5 (5/7/14).

Appellant did not violate DO 300.1 by answering calls from a co-worker with “what are you wearing?” where  the words were not patently offensive, the co-worker willingly engaged in the practice, and it was a common greeting among some employees, including the co-worker. In re Gutierrez, CSA 65-11, 7-8 (8/28/12).

Supervisor’s gestures to a co-worker to lift her shirt and sit on his lap was not immoral conduct under CO 300.1 where agency failed to establish the orderly performance of their duties were impaired thereby, or that the public lost confidence in the agency. In re Gutierrez, CSA 65-11, 8 (8/28/12).

Deputy violated this rule by his acknowledgment that he wore his uniform and sidearm to his child support hearing. In re Strauch, CSA 37-11, 7 (12/20/11).

Hearing officer erred in analyzing this rule under a subjective standard. In re Gutierrez, Colo.App. 65-11, 13 (5/19/16).

Agency proved Deputy sheriff violated this rule when she yelled obscenities at a secured inmate during book-in, distracted deputies engaged with other inmates, and disrupted the book-in area, with potentially dangerous results. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 15 (2/27/09).

Deputy sheriff's unjustified violence against an inmate was disorderly performance of her duty to keep inmates safe. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 22 (2/27/09).

Appellant did not prove the agency was clearly erroneous in determining he violated RR 300.11.2 (Aggravated Conduct Prohibited by Law) by committing a third-degree assault on an inmate, where his inappropriate use of force of the inmate met the elements of a third-degree assault. In re Keller, CSA 47-14, 8-9 (6/14/18).

The agency properly determined appellant committed a third-degree assault by a preponderance of the evidence, applicable to civil matters, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Keller, CSA 47-14, 8 (6/14/18), citing handbook Appendix C; Black v. Black, 422 P.3d 592, 607 (Colo.App. 2018); CSR 16-61 [now 16-23].

Agency’s determination that violation of RR 300.11.6 (Conduct Prejudicial) was a Conduct Category F violation warranting dismissal was clearly erroneous, where appellant’s inappropriate force caused minimal injury, and the agency assessed a lower Conduct Category in similar cases; it instead constituted a Conduct Category E violation warranting a 60-day suspension. In re Keller, CSA 47-14, 10 (6/14/18).

Appellant did not prove the agency was clearly erroneous in determining he violated RR 300.11.6 (Conduct Prejudicial), where the videos of his inappropriate use of force were leaked to the media and exposed the City to sensationalized, negative press and numerous deputies interrupted their duties to assist him. In re Keller, CSA 47-14, 10 (6/14/18). 

Violation found where several subordinates who observed high-ranking officer expedite high-profile inmate’s booking procedure expressed alarm at the officer’s security lapses and improper procedures. In re Koonce, CSA 34-17, 6-7 (12/22/17).

Violation found where some subordinates who observed high-ranking officer expedite high-profile inmate’s booking procedures feared for their careers by officer’s asking them to disregard security policy, resulting in conduct unbecoming an officer. In re Koonce, CSA 34-17, 6-7 (12/22/17).

Under DSD’s disciplinary matrix, a decision-maker has the latitude to assess a penalty between category A-F for a violation under RR 300.11.6. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 17 (12/8/17).

No more than the presumptive penalty may be assessed for appellant’s violation of this rule when considering unblemished and highly-decorated history. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 18 (12/8/17).

Violation of the “good order and effectiveness” portion of this rule established by high-ranking officer sending his subordinate-ranking sister to meet a public figure to take his charge into custody. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 10 (12/8/17).

No violation of the “conduct unbecoming” portion of this rule established by DSD claim that high-ranking officer engaged in a failure of leadership. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 10 (12/8/17).

Agency did not prove high-ranking officer’s conduct brought disrepute on DSD where it made conclusory statements alleging it but did not present evidence to establish a causal link between officer’s actions and this subsection. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 10 (12/8/17).

The same evidence that proved a violation of the “good order and effectiveness” portion of RR 300.11.6 also established a violation of CSR 16-29T. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 10 (12/8/17).

CSB did not abuse its discretion in affirming violation of RR 300.11.6 even though hearing officer made inconsistent findings, where other evidence was sufficient to find deputy created a security risk prejudicial to the good order and effectiveness of the DSD and which compromised its integrity. In re Leyba, DDC 31-16, 7-8 (11/15/17).

Agency did not prove that deputy violated this rule where deputy’s partner separated the deputy and inmate because he believed inmate’s abuse was getting under deputy’s skin, but he did not believe the deputy was out of control, and other observers were not shocked, scared or dumbfounded by deputy’s conduct. In re Turner, CSA 01-17, 9 (6/26/17).

Where inattention of courtroom deputy caused judge genuine alarm about security risk, agency proved conduct prejudicial under this rule. In re Leyba, CSB 31-16, 2 (3/2/17).

Conduct prejudicial to the good order and effectiveness of the department may be established without proof of actual harm to the department. In re Leyba, CSA 31-16, 7 (8/29/16), citing In re Redacted, CSB 31-12, 5 (10/3/13).

Court deputy’s neglect and carelessness caused prejudice to department by harming its reputation with the judge, who became alarmed and sought her removal from court duty. In re Leyba, CSA 31-16, 6-7 (8/29/16).

Deputy’s unintentional error in calling an inmate Abdul instead of Mohammed is not the type of conduct targeted by this rule, despite its indirect role in leading other inmates to taunt the deputy. In re Underwood, CSA 55-15, 10 (4/29/16).

Agency did not prove sergeant provided wrongful preferential treatment to inmate where it alleged he permitted her to change to civilian clothes for arraignment and caused confusion to release staff, but it failed to prove sergeant authorized the change, who was confused by his action, or whether the alleged confusion resulted in reasonably foreseeable harm. In re Rolando, CSA 40-15, 8 (1/26/16).

Agency did not prove sergeant provided preferential treatment under this rule even if it proved he permitted special management inmate to change clothes for arraignment, since it was within his discretion to do so. In re Rolando, CSA 40-15, 8 (1/26/16).

Agency did not prove violation where it claimed that media coverage of alleged preferential treatment brought disrepute on it and compromised its integrity, but it did not provide evidence of media coverage and hypothetical negative image was too tenuous. In re Rolando, CSA 40-15, 9 (1/26/16).

Fraternization is not limited to sexual relationships, but includes any personal relationship between a deputy and an inmate. In re Romero, CSA 01-12, 9 (4/17/12).

Deputy sheriff violated this rule where he spent inordinate amounts of time with an inmate, placed his own funds in her inmate account, sought her out 10 times per month when she was out of custody, and engaged in a twenty-minute phone call from her. In re Romero, CSA 01-12, 9 (4/17/12).

Deputy sheriff’s failure to self-report his personal relationship with an inmate was a violation of this rule. In re Romero, CSA 01-12, 9 (4/17/12).

Agency’s determination that violation of RR 300.19.1 (Disobedience of Rule) was a Conduct Category F violation warranting dismissal was clearly erroneous, where appellant used inappropriate force to the neck with minimal injury, and the agency assessed a lower Conduct Category in similar cases; it instead constituted a Conduct Category E violation warranting a 60-day suspension. In re Keller, CSA 47-14, 12 (6/14/18).

Appellant did not prove the agency was clearly erroneous in determining that he violated RR 300.19.1 (Disobedience of Rule), where he proceeded to use inappropriate use of force rather than deescalate an incident with an inmate. In re Keller, CSA 47-14, 10 (6/14/18).

Deputy violated rule when he failed to check eligibility of inmate before releasing him. In re Mitchell, CSA 57-13, 5 (5/7/14) [as it pertains to RR 400.4.4].

CSR 16-60 Y and DO 300.19 apply only in the absence of a more specific applicable rule. In re Gutierrez, CSA 65-11, 8 (8/28/12).

This catchall rule is cumulative where other more specific career service rules are alleged by the agency. In re Gutierrez, CSA 65-11, 8 (8/28/12).

The application of more specific rule violations renders this catchall rule moot. In re Strauch, CSA 37-11, 7 (12/20/11).

Deputy violated her primary duties of care and control of inmates under this rule when she yelled obscenities at inmate through closed door, causing other inmates to yell back and diverting other deputies' attention from control of other inmates. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 16 (2/27/09).

The application of more specific rule violation renders this catchall rule moot. In re Strauch, CSA 37-11, 7 (12/20/11).

This strict liability rule applies irrespective of intent. In re Strauch, CSA 37-11, 7-8 (12/20/11).

Deputy who wore his uniform and sidearm outside of work violated this rule irrespective of his intent. In re Strauch, CSA 37-11, 7-8 (12/20/11).

This rule requires deputies actively to read and maintain familiarity with all agency orders and procedures. In re Strauch, CSA 37-11, 7-8 (12/20/11).

Agency failed to prove this violation where it failed to specify what conduct violated the order. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 16 (2/27/09). 

Hearing officer did not misinterpret RR 300.21.2 where appellant’s proposed interpretation would  permit preferential treatment of anyone who is not an agency employee or public official. In re Koonce, CSB 34-17, 4 (6/21/18).

Hearing officer did err in finding this rule requires employees to maintain strict impartiality in the performance of duties. In re Koonce, CSB 34-17, 5 (6/21/18).

This rule encompasses the duty to avoid preferential treatment. In re Koonce, CSA 34-17, 5 (12/22/17).

Violation established where high-ranking officer claimed she was merely implementing policy of good customer service by personally escorting an inmate, a member of a prominent family, through shortcuts in the book-in process, but she did so exclusively for this inmate, precisely the conduct proscribed by this rule. In re Koonce, CSA 34-17, 5 (12/22/17).

Agency’s interpretation of this rule as applying to non-employees is entitled to deference where: appellant was aware of the obligation not to engage even in the appearance of impropriety; appellant’s twelve calls and texts with a well-connected citizen over the terms of an arrest suggested a partial attitude, and appellant provided no alternate interpretation. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 7-8 (12/8/17), citing Chevron USA Inc., v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

Violation established where appellant/chief asked another high-ranking subordinate who was largely unfamiliar with the remand process to meet a self-remanded inmate in the facility lobby with the inference she would accompany arrestee to intake. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 9 (12/8/17).

Violation established despite appellant/chief claim that he would do the same for anyone, when he asked another high-ranking officer to meet and, inferably, accompany an arrestee to Intake.  If everyone with a warrant could arrange the terms of their own arrests, then command staff would have little time for other duties and arrest warrants would become meaningless. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 9 (12/8/17). 

Violation not established where agency claimed appellant demonstrated partial attitude by trying to expedite a citizen’s book-in process, but he only asked a subordinate to meet the citizen, and it was not foreseeable the subordinate would take it on herself to expedite the process. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 9 (12/8/17).

Category C of DSD’s disciplinary matrix was a reasonable assessment of harm done when appellant-chief privately negotiated the terms of surrender into custody of the granddaughter of the ex-mayor. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 16 (12/8/17).

Under DSD disciplinary matrix the higher an officer’s rank, the more is expected, and may be an aggravating factor. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 16 (12/8/17).

Under DSD disciplinary matrix, appellant’s rank as chief was aggravating factor in assessing discipline under this rule. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 16 (12/8/17).

Even taking appellant’s rank as an aggravating factor, no more than the presumptive penalty could reasonably be assessed for violation of 300.21.2 when considering his unblemished and highly-decorated history. In re Wilson, CSA 38-17, 17 (12/8/17).

RR 300.22 prohibits deputy sheriffs from using inappropriate force in dealing with a prisoner. In re Nguyen, CSA 19-17, 5 (7/25/17).

Deputies’ need to secure the cell door flaps and their need generally to preserve order and discipline do not afford them the discretion to ignore the agency’s Use of Force policy. In re Hammernik & Trujillo, CSB 41-17A & 42-17A, 2-3 (2/7/19).

Evidence in the record supports the Hearing Officer’s conclusion that deputies improperly escalated their force on an inmate, where they claimed they had reacted to his throwing liquid on them but they had escalated their force before he threw the liquid, and the inmate’s threat level had remained constant since he remained locked in his cell. In re Hammernik & Trujillo, CSB 41-17A & 42-17A, 3 (2/7/19).

A deputy’s use of force must be objectively reasonable under the circumstances. In re Hammernik & Trujillo, CSB 41-17A & 42-17A, 3 (2/7/19).

Appellants’ allegation, that for any situation the appropriate force is whatever the deputy believes reasonable, is a gross misstatement of agency policy. In re Hammernik & Trujillo, CSB 41-17A & 42-17A, 3 (2/7/19).

Fact that deputies could have used more egregious force on an inmate did not render incorrect the Hearing Officer’s conclusion that that they used excessive force. In re Hammernik & Trujillo, CSB 41-17A & 42-17A, 4 (2/7/19).

Deputies’ use of excessive force, in violation of agency policy, that caused injury to inmate put the agency at financial risk. In re Hammernik & Trujillo, CSB 41-17A & 42-17A, 4 (2/7/19).

A deputy’s use of force must be objectively reasonable under the circumstances. In re Hammernik & Trujillo, CSB 41-17A & 42-17A, 3 (2/7/19).

If deputies determined the appropriate level of discipline, there would never be a violation of policy. In re Hammernik & Trujillo, CSB 41-17A & 42-17A, 3 CSB (2/7/19).

It is well-established that the Agency requires its deputies to use the least amount of force necessary to achieve a legitimate detention-related function. In re Hammernik and Trujillo, CSA 41-17 & 42-17, 4 (3/21/18), citing In re St. Germain, CSA 24-14, 3 (11/7/2014); In re Nguyen, CSA 19-17, 5 (7/25/17). 

While appellants had the obligation to secure door flaps, which one inmate was obstructing, excessive force to do so is not permitted under these rules. In re Hammernik and Trujillo, CSA 41-17 & 42-17, 4 (3/21/18), citing In re Roybal, CSA 44-16 (10/3/16); In re Nguyen, CSA 19-17 (7/25/17).

Fact that deputy likely knew inmate threw juice, and not urine, on him undermined his justification for a higher degree of force. In re Hammernik and Trujillo, CSA 41-17 & 42-17, 4 (3/21/18).

Deputies’ use of pain compliance with OPNs on inmate in cell after the fact of inmate’s assault did not prevent, de-escalate, or otherwise address an imminent threat, and, therefore was unjustified. In re Hammernik and Trujillo, CSA 41-17 & 42-17, 4 (3/21/18).

Deputies violated RR-5011.1M (Force), and thus violated CSR 16-29R [now 16-28R], through their use of pain compliance with OPNs on inmate in cell after the fact of inmate’s assault, where inmate was not actively resisting. In re Hammernik and Trujillo, CSA 41-17 & 42-17, 4 (3/21/18).

The agency consistently finds when an inmate is secured in his cell, a high degree of force to coerce him into retracting his hands from a door flap is prohibited. In re Hammernik and Trujillo, CSA 41-17 & 42-17, 4-5 (3/21/18), citing In re Roybal, CSA 44-16 (10/3/16); In re Nguyen, CSA 19-17 (7/25/17).

The failure of a lesser degree of force on an otherwise passive-resistant inmate does not automatically justify the use of a significantly higher degree of force. In re Hammernik and Trujillo, CSA 41-17 & 42-17, 5 (3/21/18).

Deputies violated RR 300.22 (Inappropriate Force), and thus violated CSR 16-29R [now 16-28R], through their use of pain compliance with OPNs on an inmate after the fact of inmate’s assault, where inmate was not actively resisting. In re Hammernik and Trujillo, CSA 41-17 & 42-17, 5 (3/21/18).

The Agency proved Appellant violated RR 300.22 when he backed away from a locked inmate’s reach, who had prevented him from closing the cell door flap, other methods to secure the door flap were available, there was no immediate risk of harm, but Appellant then used his Taser to force compliance by the inmate. In re Nguyen, CSA 19-17, 5 (7/25/17).

Appropriate focus in determining violation of this rule was disapproved use of deputy’s knee to press behind inmate’s ear, not whether visible injury resulted. In re Cole, CSA 04-18, 3 (4/6/18).

Appellant’s claim that using his knee to control inmate’s head was not excessive was unpersuasive where inmate was well- controlled by four deputies, two more stood ready to help, use of knee to the head is not approved technique, and it is illogical that use of knee is more controllable than the hand. In re Cole, CSA 04-18, 3-4 (4/6/18).

Hearing officer did not misinterpret DSD Use of force policy where, once deputy stepped back from inmate who was trying to grab him through door flap, deputy was no longer under attack and became the aggressor when he re-approached and used his Taser on the inmate. In re Nguyen, CSB 19-17, 2 (1/18/18).

Hearing officer did not misinterpret DSD’s use of force policy in finding deputy’s use of Taser on an inmate through the door flap to secure the flap was unreasonable, where deputy had numerous less-forceful options available. In re Nguyen, CSB 19-17, 2 (1/18/18).

Deputy did not use the least amount of force available to him where, even if he needed to secure cell door flap, he could have employed the assistance of another deputy instead of Tasing inmate in his cell. In re Nguyen, CSB 19-17, 2 (1/18/18).

Deputy’s use of Taser was not objectively reasonable where he had numerous options available to secure door flap that did not include high level of force. In re Nguyen, CSB 19-17, 2 (1/18/18).

Deputy who choked and punched inmate bent over a metal desk and being held by another officer violated this rule prohibiting inappropriate use of force. In re Turner, CSA 01-17, 8 (6/26/17).

No force at all was necessary, even though unsecured cell door flap can allow an inmate to swing his arm through the flap, where inmate was locked in his cell, not throwing anything, not reaching for deputy and was not a threat to anyone else. In re Roybal, CSB 44-16, 2 (5/18/17).

Appellant-deputy claim of necessity not established where he claimed he had to kick door cell flap to entice inmate to back away so that he could secure flap, but after kicking the flap, deputy walked away without securing it. In re Roybal, CSB 44-16A, 2 (5/18/17).

No violation found where video did not prove either deputy forced inmate’s head into corner of elevator beyond what was reasonable and necessary to forestall inmate’s attempts to head-butt and mule kick them. In re Garegnani & Jones, CSA 29-16 & 30-16, 3 (3/6/17).

No violation found where, contrary to agency’s assertion, deputy took care, when taking inmate to the floor, to protect inmate’s head from striking floor. In re Garegnani & Jones, CSA 29-16 & 30-16, 4 (3/6/17).

No violation found where agency alleged deputy kneeled on inmate’s head for over two minutes, but video evidence was inconclusive, and deputy credibly stated he applied only enough pressure to keep inmate from spitting as he had done earlier. In re Garegnani & Jones, CSA 29-16 & 30-16, 5 (3/6/17).

Deputy was properly found to have violated this rule where deputy pushed the back of an inmate walking away, struck him in the face when he turned around, then held him in a neck lock. In re Fuller, CSA 46-16, 6 (10/11/16).

Deputy was not in reasonable fear of attack where the inmate was walking away, and their verbal confrontation led only to physical withdrawal by the other inmates present. In re Fuller, CSA 46-16, 6 (10/11/16).

Hearing officer did not misinterpret this rule where there was record evidence to support her conclusion under D.O. 5011.1J, and the provisions of the two rules are similar. In re Kemp, CSB 19-13, 5 (7/28/14).

Under regulation requiring  objectively reasonable use of force, finding that force was unreasonable was supported by evidence that deputy slapped inmate out of anger, inmate was not resisting or posing a threat, and deputy failed to follow jail guidelines or employ approved control techniques. In re Kemp, CSB 19-13, 4 (7/29/14).

Deputy needlessly escalated an annoying comment by an inmate and engaged in an unreasonable use of force when he pushed and held an inmate's head against the wall, put his hands on his neck and slapped him. In re Kemp, CSA 19-13, 11 (1/2/14).

Deputy was not justified in putting his hands on an inmate's neck, pushing his head against the wall and slapping an inmate for making an annoying comment. In re Kemp, CSA 19-13, 9-11 (1/2/14).

Where record demonstrated that deputy acted intentionally and out of anger in slapping an inmate, it supported a finding of intimidation of a prisoner. In re Kemp, CSB 19-13, 6 (7/28/14).

This rule prohibits DSD employees from engaging in any form of discrimination or harassment against prisoners due to race, color, or other protected status. In re Simons, CSB 71-16, 2 (1/18/18).

Deputy’s referring to inmates as “monkeys,” is tacit discrimination in violation of RR 400.2. In re Simons, CSB 71-16, 2 (1/18/18).

Violation found when appellant referred to Black and Hispanic inmates as “monkeys,” a racial epithet. Appellant’s claim that he intended the reference to be non-racist was immaterial since the term is an objectively-racist reference to dark-skinned people. In re Simons, CSA 71-16, 4-5 (5/5/17). 

Agency failed to prove deputy discriminated or harassed a prisoner when he mistakenly called him Abdul instead of Mohammed. In re Underwood, CSA 55-15, 10 (4/29/16).

Agency’s discipline for alleged violation of RR 400.4.1 (Cruel Treatment) was clearly erroneous where inappropriate force caused the inmate minor injury, albeit it caused the inmate pain, appellant did not make humiliating or insulting comments to the inmate, and the deputies promptly ended the incident once they handcuffed the inmate. In re Keller, CSA 47-14, 13 (6/14/18). 

Release officer was not free to rely on the record officer’s release directive in JMS where it was directly contradicted by the court mittimus, the controlling document. In re Espinoza, CSA 14-16, 6 (7/27/16).

Evidence supported hearing officer’s finding that appellant’s threatening comment and flinging an inmate’s tray, still full of food, toward the inmate was taunting, harassing, and maliciously embarrassing conduct. In re Jordan, CSB 21-18A, 4 (5/16/19).

Hearing Officer reasonably inferred appellant’s malicious intent from his actions of threatening an inmate and throwing the inmate’s tray, still full of food, at him. In re Jordan, CSB 21-18A, 4 (5/16/19).

Custodial employees are required to treat people, including inmates, decently, with dignity and respect. In re Jordan, CSB 21-18A, 4 (5/16/19).

 

Appellant’s comment to an inmate - If you think that is fucked up, you ain’t seen anything yet - was a taunt, defined as “to reproach or challenge in a mocking or insulting manner : jeer at.” In re Jordan, CSA 21-18, 4 (7/19/18).

Appellant’s threatening comment to and flinging an inmate’s food tray onto the floor, constituted harassment, defined as “to create an unpleasant or hostile situation for especially by uninvited and unwelcome verbal or physical conduct.” In re Jordan, CSA 21-18, 4-5 (7/19/18).

Appellant threatening comment to and flinging an inmate’s food tray onto the floor, intimidated and embarrassed the inmate maliciously, defined as “having or showing a desire to cause harm to someone : given to, marked by, or arising from malice,” supplemented with the definition of malice, “desire to cause pain, injury, or distress to another.” In re Jordan, CSA 21-18, 5 (7/19/18).

No abuse of discretion in hearing officer’s finding inmate’s testimony more No abuse of discretion in hearing officer’s finding inmate’s testimony more credible than deputy where his claim of inmates’ potential collusion was unsupported by evidence of false testimony. In re Simons, CSB 71-16, 2-3 (1/18/18).

Violation established where deputy called inmates snitches and talked to them about shooting and killing them. In re Simons, CSB 71-16, n.7 (1/18/18).

Dismissal justified by deputy’s referring to inmates as monkeys. In re Simons, CSB 71-16, 4 (1/18/18).

Violation found where inmates consistently stated that appellant bragged he would have shot dead an inmate who DPD officer wounded, and appellant failed to rebut their credibility, establish collusion, or establish one of the inmates intimidated the others into making false reports. In re Simons, CSA 71-16, 5 (5/5/17).

Violation found where appellant referred to inmates who filed grievances against him as “snitches,” and such reference could well place those inmates in danger. In re Simons, CSA 71-16, 5 (5/5/17).

Deputy sheriff who yelled obscenities at inmate, threatened and harassed inmate in violation of this rule. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 15-16 (2/27/09). 

Agency’s determination that violation of RR 400.6 (Abuse of Prisoners) was a Conduct Category F violation warranting dismissal was clearly erroneous, where appellant used inappropriate force to the neck with minimal injury, and the agency assessed a lower Conduct Category in similar cases; it instead constituted a Conduct Category E violation warranting a 60-day suspension. In re Keller, CSA 47-14, 13 (6/14/18)

Appellant did not prove the agency was clearly erroneous in its determination that he violated RR 400.6 (Abuse of Prisoners), where he proceeded to use inappropriate use of force rather than deescalate an incident with an inmate. In re Keller, CSA 47-14, 13 (6/14/18).  

Accepting appellant’s proposal to adopt the plain and ordinary meaning of this rule’s words, CSB concludes that hearing officer properly applied it by finding that deputy engaged in abuse when he put his hands on the inmate’s neck and slapped him for no legitimate reason. In re Kemp, CSB 19-13, 5 (7/28/14), citing American Heritage College Dictionary (Third Edition).

Deputy did not violate this rule where his only delays in reaching inmate threatening suicide were caused by the need to assemble the force required to do the job safely. In re Trujillo, CSA 18-17, 5 (8/16/17).

Deputy did not violate this rule where he took action as soon as he saw that an inmate threatening suicide had obtained the means to do so. In re Trujillo, CSA 18-17, 5 (8/16/17).

Hearing Officer, in finding appellant violated RR 400.8.2, did not provide a detailed analysis of whether he acted willfully or negligently but had to have found that he acted willfully or negligently, either of which is a violation of the rule. In re Fazio, CSB 14-18A, 3 (4/17/19).

Appellant’s argument that the hearing officer erred by not specifying whether he willfully or negligently violated RR-400.8.2 does not state an appellate issue since he does not allege a misinterpretation of a rule, a factual insufficiency or a policy setting precedent. In re DeMello, CSB 12-18A, 3 (4/17/19).

Hearing officer, when finding that appellant violated RR-400.8.2, failed to provide a detailed analysis of whether he acted willfully or negligently but had to have found that he acted willfully or negligently, either of which is a violation of the rule. In re DeMello, CSB 12-18A, 3-4 (4/17/19).

Intent of an employee can be inferred from the employee’s actions and from the circumstances. In re DeMello, CSB 12-18A, 4 (4/17/19).

The undisputed video evidence shows that appellants did not make the rounds of the detention facility as required by RR 400.8.2 (Required Rounds), and disposed of their claimed defenses against the agency’s allegation that they violated the rule. In re DeMello and Fazio, CSA 12-18 & 14-18, 6-7 (6/7/18).

Appellant’s acknowledged failure to make required rounds established violation of this rule. In re Barra, CSA 1-16, 4 (3/10/17).

Violation established where appellant acknowledged she was aware of this rule’s requirement to document all her rounds, but failed to do so. In re Barra, CSA 1-16, 4 (3/10/17).

Violation found where appellant acknowledged she failed to thoroughly search inmate she took into custody. In re Koonce, CSA 34-17, 7 (12/22/17).

Appellant’s status as captain and acting chief required him to set a respectful tone rather than accept or participate in locker-room banter in the DSD. In re Gutierrez, CSA 65-11, 8-9 (8/28/12).

Captain violated D.O. 1100.4, requiring appropriate workplace conduct, by making sexually-oriented comments and gestures toward a co-worker, even though co-worker fully participated in the sexual banter. In re Gutierrez, CSA 65-11, 8 (8/28/12).

Captain violated D.O. 1100.4 when he disregarded his supervisor's counseling to act more professionally, responded to a subordinate’s request for time off by texting her “only if u r nice to me,” told a female co-worker to unbutton her blouse more, motioned for her to expose her breasts and sit on his lap, and failed to stop inappropriate conversation by others, cautioning them instead to "just be careful". In re Gutierrez, CSA 65-11, 8-9 (8/28/12).

Appellant violated CSR 16-60L (Violation of agency regulation) [now 16-28 R] by violating RR 1100.8 (Failure to Supervise) by violating the Captain’s Essential Duties, “formulating tactical approaches to potential crisis situations” when he failed to formulate a tactical approach to the crisis posed an inmate by under medical distress. In re Johnson, CSB 24-17A, 2 (1/17/19).

Hearing Officer misconstrued RR 1100.8 (Failure to Supervise) by reading the Captain’s Essential Duties, “formulating tactical approaches to potential crisis situations” to apply only to a potential crisis but not an actual crisis. In re Johnson, CSB 24-17A, 2 (1/17/19).

Appellant violated CSR 16-60L (Violation of Agency Regulation) [now 16-28 R] by violating RR 1100.8 (Failure to Supervise) by violating the Captain’s Essential Duties, “[p]roviding work instruction and assistance to employees with difficult and/or unusual assignments,” when he failed to formulate a tactical approach to the crisis posed by an inmate under medical distress. In re Johnson, CSB 24-17A, 2-3 (1/17/19).

Appellant violated CSR 16-60L (Violation of Agency Regulation) [now 16-28 R] by violating RR 1100.8 (Failure to Supervise) by violating the Captain’s Minimum Qualifications for Problem-Solving, when he failed to formulate a tactical approach to the crisis posed by an inmate under medical distress. In re Johnson, CSB 24-17A, 3 (1/17/19).

An employee’s minimum qualifications set floors regarding experience, knowledge, abilities and standards of conduct. In re Johnson, CSB 24-17A, 3 (1/17/19).

An employee’s minimum qualifications inform an employee that he is bound and obligated to meet these qualifications at all times. In re Johnson, CSB 24-17A, 3 (1/17/19).

An employee’s minimum qualifications are the basic foundation of the job, and the employee is subject to discipline any time his conduct falls below or is inconsistent with the minimum qualifications. In re Johnson, CSB 24-17A, 3 (1/17/19).

D.O. 2420.1B states the DSD’s sexual harassment policy. In re Gutierrez, Colo. App. 65-11, 13 (5/19/16).

The DSD has a zero tolerance for and strictly prohibits harassment in and outside of the workplace. In re Gutierrez, Colo. App. 65-11, 13 (5/19/16), citing D.O. 2420.1.B.(2).

Male officer’s gesturing to female colleague to lift her shirt and to sit on his lap was sexual harassment in violation of this rule, since he admitted those gestures violated Agency’s sexual harassment policy. In re Gutierrez, Colo. App. 65-11, 13-16 (5/19/16).

Male officer’s gesturing to female colleague to lift her shirt and sit on his lap did not violate “demand for sexual favors” portion of this policy even though it violated other portions of agency’s sexual harassment policy, where gestures were part of consensual sexual banter, rather than a one-way demand for sexual favors. In re Gutierrez, Colo. App. 65-11, 13-16 (5/19/16).

This rule does not require evidence that a third party witness actually observed the harassment and was offended by it. In re Gutierrez, CSB 65-11, 5 (4/4/13).

Presence of the word “could” in this D.O. means the actual presence of an offended witness is not required to prove a violation. In re Gutierrez, CSB 65-11, 4 (4/4/13).  

The plain language of this rule requires an objective analysis of the conduct at issue. In re Gutierrez, CSB 65-11, (4/4/13).  

Even though appellant’s gestures to colleague to expose her breasts and to sit on his lap did not establish sexual harassment where she actively participated in sexual banter, his gestures could be deemed offensive by reasonable third party, thus in violation of this rule. In re Gutierrez, CSB 65-11, 5 (4/4/13).

Hearing officer did not misinterpret this rule where there was ample evidence to establish a violation under D.O. 5011.1J, and the provisions of the two rules are similar. In re Kemp, CSB 19-13, 5 (7/28/14).

Conduct is measured by an objective standard under departmental rule requiring sheriffs to adhere to guiding standards of conduct and ethical rules. In re Gutierrez, CSA 65-11, 12 (8/28/12).

Conduct violated department's objective standards of conduct when it was deemed offensive by three employees and appellant admitted the conduct was stupid and caused him to be ashamed. In re Gutierrez, CSA 65-11, 12 (8/28/12).

Written directives couched in vague, aspirational terms like "accountable for everything we do" and "strive for excellence" and reference to the golden rule provide guidance but are not enforceable orders. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 7, 17 (2/27/09).

Deputy’s acknowledgment that he wore his uniform and sidearm to his child support hearing established a violation of this rule, regardless of his of his intent. In re Strauch, CSA 37-11, 8 (12/20/11).

Where DSD dress code required hair adornments to be of minimal size, plain design, and matching or dark color, appellant's persistent refusal to remove seven-inch long, brightly colored, flapping butterfly hair sticks that did not match her hair violated dress code under this rule. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 9-10 (2/27/09).

Hearing officer did not err in imputing a reasonableness requirement into supervisor’s decision to send a subordinate to a fitness for duty exam when the supervisor believes the employee cannot perform his or her duties due to medical problems or disabilities.  In re Martinez, CSB 09-12, 3 (8/15/13).   

DSD D.O. on fitness for duty examinations does not  authorize a supervisor to send an employee for an examination out of spite or on a whim, or without sufficient information to form a reasonable belief that mental or physical issues or disabilities prevent the employee from performing the job in an acceptable manner. In re Martinez, CSB 09-12, 3 (8/15/13).   

Supervisor who ordered fitness for duty examination did not have reasonable basis for concluding that employee had a breakdown when she did not witness the incident, and the direct supervisors who witnessed it did not believe it was a breakdown and would have returned the employee to work. In re Martinez, CSB 09-12, 4 (8/15/13).  

Lacking sufficient information to reasonably conclude that appellant's inappropriate behavior prevented her from performing her job acceptably due to medical problems or disabilities, management faced a disciplinary rather than a medical issue. In re Martinez, CSB 09-12, 4 (8/15/13).  

Deference to management decision-making cannot replace evidence or the requirement that management have sufficient information to warrant a reasonable belief that a fitness for duty examination is justified. In re Martinez, CSB 09-12, 4 (8/15/13).

Hearing Officer misconstrued RR 4001.00 (Priorities) by finding that it prioritized the safety of nurses and responding officers over the medical emergency of an inmate. In re Johnson, CSB 24-17A, 4 (1/17/19).

RR 4001.00 (Priorities) prioritized an inmate’s life, when the inmate’s life was in danger, over the safety of the responding nurses and deputies. In re Johnson, CSB 24-17A, 4 (1/17/19).

It is well settled that the care and custody of inmates are the top priorities of the Agency. In re Johnson, CSB 24-17A, 4 (1/17/19).

An inmate’s life is not to be valued more highly than the life of a deputy or a nurse. In re Johnson, CSB 24-17A, fn.1 (1/17/19).

When the life of a deputy or nurse is in as great peril as that of an inmate, the inmate’s health and safety do not take priority over the health and safety of nurses of deputies. In re Johnson, CSB 24-17A, fn.1 (1/17/19).

Hearing Officer improperly allowed an appellant’s expert witness to set agency policy and standards by accepting the testimony of the expert witness over that of the agency Civilian Review Administrator. In re Johnson, CSB 24-17A, 5 (1/17/19).

The agency is empowered with determining whether its employees are performing in accordance with its standards. In re Johnson, CSB 24-17A, 5 (1/17/19).

Deputy violated CSR 16-29 R (Violation of agency regulation) [now 16-28R] by violating Building 22 Post Order and DO 4050.11 (Control inmate movement) when he failed to pat search inmates entering and leaving the residential pod. In re Fergerson, CSA 64-17, 5-6 (3/16/18).

IN GENERAL 

Deputy’s unwarranted hyperbole concerning dire consequences of deputies handling inmates was insufficient reason to reverse his violation for excessive use of force. In re Fuller, CSB 46-16, 3 (3/16/17).

Deputy violated this rule when he pushed an inmate walking away in the back, struck him in the face when he turned around, then grabbed him in a neck lock, and pulled him to the ground. In re Fuller, CSA 46-16, 6 (10/11/16).

Deputy was not in reasonable fear of attack from inmate who was walking away, and their verbal confrontation led only to physical withdrawal by the other inmates present. In re Fuller, CSA 46-16, 6 (10/11/16).

The reasonableness of force used against an inmate is evaluated taking into consideration whether the inmate presented an imminent threat or was resisting a lawful command, and the severity of the force applied. In re Kemp, CSB 19-13, 4 (7/28/14).

Hearing officer did not misinterpret this rule to contain some sort of personal space or ploy provision where she only mentioned that concept in the decision's summary of the decision-maker's testimony. In re Kemp, CSB 19-13, 4 (7/28/14).

Hearing officer’s conclusion that deputy’s use of force violated this order was supported by evidence that deputy was angry, needlessly escalated the situation, disregarded approved control techniques and jail guidelines for dealing with belligerent inmates, and the inmate posed no threat and did not resist an order. In re Kemp, CSB 19-13, 4 (7/28/14).

Force is determined to be objectively reasonable if the subject presents an imminent threat, resists a lawful command, and the nature of the force used is objectively reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances. In re Kemp, CSA 19-13, 10 (1/2/14).

In choosing an appropriate force option, officers must rely on their training, experience and assessment of the situation, including the nature of the inmate's resistance. In re Kemp, CSA 19-13, 10 (1/2/14).

Agency finding that deputy used unreasonable force was supported by jail video and witness testimony contradicting his statements that he was calm and the inmate was defiantly refusing an order. In re Kemp, CSA 19-13, 10 (1/2/14).

Deputy's failure to use an authorized control hold and follow guidelines for belligerent inmates are relevant to whether he used reasonable force. In re Kemp, CSA 19-13, 11 (1/2/14).

The expert witness’s testimony on a use of force was weakened by fact that he based his opinion only on deputy's version of events, and did not review the entire file. In re Kemp, CSA 19-13, 11 (1/2/14).

Agency decision-maker’s review of all witness interviews, statements, agency summaries, and analysis of deputy's changing statements supported her credibility determinations and finding that he used excessive force. In re Kemp, CSA 19-13, 11 (1/2/14).

Deputy violated this rule where he needlessly escalated an annoying comment by an inmate, and engaged in an unreasonable use of force. In re Kemp, CSA 19-13, 11 (1/2/14).

Deputy sheriff violated D.O. on use of force when she shoved the face of a non-threatening, though drunk and argumentative, inmate into a plexiglass window three times, unnecessarily increasing the force of each shove. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 18-9 (2/27/09).

Deputy sheriff who used force upon an inmate violated D.O. by failing to file required use-of-force incident report. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 20 (2/27/09).

Even though DSD use of force rule permits grabbing inmate's hair to prevent spitting, appellant's repeated slamming of inmate's head into plexiglass, after inmate was under control was disproportionate response, in violation of D.O. on use of force. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 19 (2/27/09).

Where deputy sheriff justified repeatedly slamming the face of a shackled inmate into plexiglass window because the inmate had spit in her face, potentially exposing her to AIDS virus, deputy's justification became suspect when deputy acknowledged she did not seek prophylactic treatment following the incident. In re Norman-Curry, CSA 28-07 & 50-08, 21 (2/27/09).

FOUND 

Use of force violation would have been proven even if deputy had established he needed to put distance between himself and inmate, since inmate was walking away from confrontation and there was no reason for deputy to use any force to put create the distance. In re Fuller, CSB 46-16, 2-3 (3/16/17).

Use of force violation established even though appellant claimed he had to shove inmate in back to curb the inmate’s disruptive behavior, since disruption had ceased when appellant shoved him. In re Fuller, CSB 46-16, 3 (3/16/17).

NOT FOUND 

Agency did not prove violation where video did not prove either deputy forced inmate’s head into corner of elevator beyond what was reasonable and necessary to control the unruly inmate, or to forestall his head-butt and mule kick. In re Garegnani & Jones, CSA 29-16 & 30-16, 3 (3/6/17).

Agency did not prove violation where, contrary to its assertion, deputy took care, when taking inmate to the floor, to protect inmate’s head from striking floor. In re Garegnani & Jones, CSA 29-16 & 30-16, 4 (3/6/17).

Agency did not prove violation by deputy lifting inmate by his handcuffs behind his back where inmate was violently resisting in a confined space which did not allow flexibility of other options, other deputies lifted inmate simultaneously by the limbs, and deputies lifted inmate only as long as necessary to remove him from elevator. In re Garegnani & Jones, CSA 29-16 & 30-16, 4 (3/6/17).

DO 5011.1M – Use of Force, requires an officer to overcome a threat by use of only such physical force as is reasonable and appropriate to accomplish a lawful objective. The measure of that reasonableness is the degree of force which is necessary and objectively reasonable under the circumstances. In re Nguyen, CSA 19-17, 3 (7/25/17).

It is well-established that the Agency requires its deputies to use the least amount of force necessary to achieve a legitimate detention-related function. In re Hammernik and Trujillo, CSA 41-17 & 42-17, 4 (3/21/18), citing In re St. Germain, CSA 24-14, 3 (11/7/2014); In re Nguyen, CSA 19-17, 5 (7/25/17). 

While appellants had the obligation to secure door flaps, which one inmate was obstructing, excessive force to do so is not permitted under these rules. In re Hammernik and Trujillo, CSA 41-17 & 42-17, 4 (3/21/18), citing In re Roybal, CSA 44-16 (10/3/16); In re Nguyen, CSA 19-17 (7/25/17).

Fact that deputy likely knew inmate threw juice, and not urine, on him undermined his justification for a higher degree of force. In re Hammernik and Trujillo, CSA 41-17 & 42-17, 4 (3/21/18).

Deputies’ use of pain compliance with OPNs on an inmate after the fact of inmate’s assault did not prevent, de-escalate, or otherwise address an imminent threat, and, therefore was unjustified. In re Hammernik and Trujillo, CSA 41-17 & 42-17, 4 (3/21/18).

Deputies violated RR-5011.1M (Force), and thus violated CSR 16-29R [now 16-28R], through their use of pain compliance with OPNs on an inmate after the fact of inmate’s assault, where inmate was behind his cell door and not actively resisting. In re Hammernik and Trujillo, CSA 41-17 & 42-17, 4 (3/21/18).

The agency consistently finds when an inmate is secured in his cell, a high degree of force to coerce him into retracting his hands from a door flap is prohibited. In re Hammernik and Trujillo, CSA 41-17 & 42-17, 4-5 (3/21/18), citing In re Roybal, CSA 44-16 (10/3/16); In re Nguyen, CSA 19-17 (7/25/17).

The failure of a lesser degree of force on an otherwise passive-resistant inmate does not automatically justify the use of a significantly higher degree of force. In re Hammernik and Trujillo, CSA 41-17 & 42-17, 5 (3/21/18).

Agency proved Appellant violated DO 5011.1M by using a Taser, excessive force under the circumstances, on a locked inmate who posed no immediate threat, but who had prevented him from closing the inmate’s door flap, which did not need to be secured immediately, and since Appellant had other, less forceful alternatives. In re Nguyen, CSA 19-17, 4 (7/25/17). 

Appropriate focus in determining violation of this rule was disapproved use of deputy’s knee to press behind inmate’s ear, not whether visible injury resulted. In re Cole, 04-18, 3 (4/6/18).

Appellant’s claim that using his knee to control inmate’s head was not excessive was unpersuasive where inmate was well-controlled by four deputies, two more stood ready to help, use of knee to the head is not approved technique, and it is illogical that pressure exerted with knee is more controllable than that exerted with hand. In re Cole, 04-18, 2-3 (4/6/18).

Appellant’s use of knee to control inmate’s head was not reasonable use of force where inmate was well-controlled by others, use of knee to the head is not approved technique, and his fear of injuring fingers to control inmate did not justify use of knee.  In re Cole, 04-18, 3 (4/6/18).

Deputy’s neck hold and punch to the face of an inmate face up on a metal desk was objectively unreasonable given the minimal threat presented, and risked causing serious head injury, in violation of rule. In re Turner, CSA 01-17, 7-8 (6/26/17).

Deputy’s use of force stemming from his confrontation over a blanket with an inmate already discharged from the jail was not related to a detention-related function. In re Turner, CSA 01-17, 8 (6/26/17).

Deputy should have factored in his greater size and the presence of three other deputies into determining the type of force to be used. In re Turner, CSA 01-17, 7-8 (6/26/17).

Appellant’s use of restraints on inmate was not justified under DSD DO 5013.1E (Use of Restraints) where inmate, who had been obnoxious and disobedient of Appellant’s directive to quit talking, was confined and alone in a sally port and thus presented virtually no risk of injury. In re Rocha, CSA 19-16, 4 (9/14/16).

Guideline for implementing DSD DO 5013.1E (Use of Restraints) prohibits the use of restraints to punish an inmate, or to force compliance with a command, when the inmate poses no physical threat. In re Rocha, CSA 19-16, 5 (9/14/16).

 

Agency did not prove deputy intended to punish inmate with restraints, where she took care to double-lock inmate’s handcuff to ensure it would not over-tighten and she did not handle inmate in a hostile or aggressive manner. In re Rocha, CSA 19-16, 5-6 (9/14/16).

Appellant violated DSD DO 5013.1E (Use of Restraints) where she handcuffed inmate who posed no physical threat but who had disregarded her orders to be seated and to refrain from talking to other inmates. In re Rocha, CSA 19-16, 6 (9/14/16).

Appellant violated guideline for implementing DSD DO 5013.1E (Use of Restraints) that prohibits restraints any longer than necessary to control the inmate and to ensure the inmate is not a threat to self or others, where she took a lunch break and left a compliant inmate in restraints. In re Rocha, CSA 19-16, 7 (9/14/16).

Hearing officer’s finding violation of this rule was not clearly erroneous where deputy admitted she handcuffed prisoner to a bench to gain compliance with her verbal commands. In re Rocha, CSB 19-16, 2 (7/6/17).

Hearing Officer’s finding that prisoner posed no threat to justify deputy handcuffing him was not clearly erroneous where prisoner passively offered his hand to deputy for handcuffing, sipped from a cup during handcuffing, and video showed no indication deputy was alarmed or concerned for her safety, or that prisoner clenched and tugged on his handcuffs, and deputy did not request assistance with any threat prisoner supposedly presented. In re Rocha, CSB 19-16, 2 (7/6/17).

Harmless error where hearing officer imputed “significant” risk into D.O. 5013.1E(4)(B), which it does not contain, but prisoner posed no risk of offense by violent inmate or offense by an unruly inmate as required by this D.O. In re Rocha, CSB 19-16, 3 (7/6/17).

Deputy violated subsection (4)(C) where she handcuffed prisoner only to effect compliance with her order that he shut up. In re Rocha, CSB 19-16, 3 (7/6/17).

Deputy might have been justified in handcuffing prisoner to a bench if prisoner were threatening someone else in the area. In re Rocha, CSB 19-16, 3 (7/6/17).

Violation established where deputy handcuffed prisoner to bench for disobeying order to desist from talking with other inmates, but deputy then left for lunch and forgot about him, since she could no longer know if continued use of restraints was justified. In re Rocha, CSB 19-16, 4 (7/6/17).

DO 5014.1K – Use of Tasers, prohibits an officer from using Electronic Control Devices to effect compliance with verbal commands where there is no physical threat. In re Nguyen, CSA 19-17, 4 (7/25/17). 

Agency proved Appellant violated DO 5014.1K when Appellant acknowledged he deployed his Taser to force a locked inmate’s compliance with his command to back away from the cell door flap. In re Nguyen, CSA 19-17, 4 (7/25/17).

Hearing officer did not misinterpret this D.O. which forbids use of Taser to effect compliance with verbal commands when there is no physical threat, where deputy withdrew from inmate who tried to grab him through door flap, then re-approached inmate and used Taser when inmate was no longer a threat. In re Nguyen, CSB 19-17, 2 (1/18/18).

SEE ALSO SHERIFF'S 7-12-14 TASER DIRECTIVE

Sheriff’s 7-12-14 Directive re Use of Taser, authorizes the use of Tasers on active aggression or aggravated active aggression, both defined as: A threat or overt act of an assault, coupled with the present ability to carry out the threat or assault, which reasonably indicates that an assault or injury to any person is imminent. In re Nguyen, CSA 19-17, 4 (7/25/17).

The Agency proved Appellant violated Directive 7-12-14 when he backed away from his entanglement with a locked inmate and was out of the inmate’s reach, who no longer had a present ability to hurt anyone, but Appellant then re-engaged and used his Taser on the inmate. In re Nguyen, CSA 19-17, 5 (7/25/17).

Appellant’s knowledge and past history with a locked inmate, who prevented him from closing the cell door flap, including the inmate’s prior intimidation and threats, did not justify Appellant’s of use a Taser, an unreasonable force in violation of Directive 7-12-14, where he was out of the inmate’s reach. In re Nguyen, CSA 19-17, 5 (7/25/17). 

Deputy did not violate this rule where he took action as soon as he saw that an inmate threatening suicide had obtained the means to do so. In re Trujillo, CSA 18-17, 5 (8/16/17).

The departmental rules require a deputy to keep careful watch over an inmate threatening suicide, but do not mandate seeking assistance after every such threat. In re Trujillo, CSA 18-17, 5 (8/16/17). 

DENVER HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY RULES, POLICIES & ORDERS 

DHS EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK, P.10, CODE OF ETHICS

Communication, Language, and Behavior

Display professionalism by using appropriate and civil language, tone and affect. Likewise, your attitude and non-verbal communication should be business-like, respectful and appropriate.

Use accurate and respectful language in your written and verbal communications to or about clients, customers or co-workers. 

Respect

Treat colleagues and clients/customers with respect.

Recognize the value of teamwork, cooperation, and collaboration as a means to provide excellent services to our clients/customers, our community and each other. 

In contrast to unenforceable vision statements in employee handbook, specific ethics provisions, which provide reasonably clear measures of behavioral expectations, are enforceable. In re Quezada, CSA 40-12, 8 (4/5/13). 

Ethics provision to treat colleagues and clients with respect, and to cooperate, and collaborate in providing excellent services, are enforceable standards. In re Quezada, CSA 40-12, 8 (4/5/13). 

Appellant’s hostile and sarcastic words and gestures to her supervisor violated established ethics standard to be respectful. In re Quezada, CSA 40-12, 9 (4/5/13).

PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT PLAN FOR 2012

Section 1- Duties

Leadership and Management

Case Management Supervisor I – Operations.

Description: Ensures that federal reporting deadlines are met…Assists employees with difficult and unusual assignments…Reviews work for accuracy and completeness…

Violation established where appellant caused agency to miss mandated compliance standard and her attempts to reassign blame were unpersuasive. In re Quezada, CSA 40-12, 7-8 (4/5/13).

 

 

 
 

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